Abstract: Bolstered by the 2008 global financial crisis, and the BRICS' increased economic weight, the group has called for change to global economic governance. The BRICS' critique and proposals are towards a re-structuring of global economic governance to reflect their increasing weight in the global political economy rather than replacing the principles and philosophy (ideas)-explicitly or implicitly-undergirding the neoliberal economic order.
I. Introduction
This paper explores the absence of a third order challenge of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) group to global economic governance. The nature of the BRICS challenge borrows from Hall's three levels of policy change; first and second order change refers to modifications to certain elements of a particular policy, while third order change to an overhaul of the overarching policy framework (Hall 1993:281-287) . Third order change can be likened to Kuhn's notion of a "paradigm shift." The latter refers to a fundamental or radical change from "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners." (Kuhn (1970:viii) . Hall (1993:280) maintains that:
instances of policy experimentation and policy failure are likely to play a key role in the movement from one paradigm to another. Like scientific paradigms, a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm […] if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, […] experiments [to resolve them] will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the existing paradigm and its advocates even further.
The financial crisis spurred much debate on the adequacy and credibility of the free market model to effectively manage the global economy -effectively, equitably and justly.
Based on Hall's argument above, the circumstances were ripe for a policy shift in the post 2008 period because, arguably, the financial crisis highlighted the crisis of the neoliberal paradigm, which opened the space for new ideas to emerge for a model for managing the global economy. That, coupled with the disquiet with global economic governance, the emerging economic prowess of the BRICS on the global stage, the inclusion of the latter via the G20, could have provided a window of opportunity for the BRICS to successfully challenge and topple the current global (neo liberal) economic order.
The rationale for referencing the BRICS in relation to fundamentally challenging global economic governance is based on these countries' call for reform of international financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis; and discussions in the academic and public spheres assessing the nature of the challenge that the BRICS pose to global economic governance. While it is well known that the BRICS themselves benefitted from the existing system, it is worth asking, whether the BRICS could have pursued a challenge to the underlying philosophy of global economic governance had the following conditions been BJIR, Marília, v. 6, n. 3, p. 442-467, set./dez. 2017. present: consensus around a body of alternative model for managing the global economy and equity in the research sphere which could have given the alternative school greater leverage in the policy environment. This line of thinking is given credence by literature which states that ideational considerations assist actors in determining what their interests may be (see for example Beland, 2009 ).
The orientation of this paper is in its focus on the role of beliefs (ideas) in effecting fundamental policy change or reinforcing policy paradigms. Although many agree that the BRICS countries are not challenging the philosophical foundation of global economic governance, scholars differ in the epistemological positions upon which they base their conclusions. Many argue that the BRICS favour the status quo because they profit and benefit materially from the existing system. By giving prominence to ideas, the paper does not discount, minimize or discredit other factors explaining the BRICS challenge to global governance. However, the paper proffers that these explanations do not comprise the totality of reasons for the BRICS not pursuing a radical challenge to global economic governance.
Notwithstanding the significance of other explanations, arguments surrounding ideas are also important aspects of the rationale for the BRICS' behaviour towards global economic governance. This paper therefore illustrates that ideational considerations are important for understanding the absence of a third order challenge to global economic governance by BRICS countries.
The paper argues, that ideational factors are key considerations for driving policy shifts. In that regard, the paper argues that the conditions do not exist to potentially enable the BRICS to mount a third order challenge to global economic governance. Specifically, these considerations include: first, a lack of consensus around the cause of the financial crisis among experts and the view that the financial crisis was a failure of the neo-liberalism; the relative disadvantage of experts who attributed the financial crisis on the flaws of the neo liberalism and who have proposed alternatives, the ancillary resources they command and the external factors that give them the edge in imposing their ideas over that of their competitors; and second, the degree of authoritativeness that one set of ideas has over others in the eyes of policy makers.
To develop this argument, I organise the paper as follows: first, I provide a conceptual framework; second, I examine the literature on the divergent perspectives on the BRICS' challenge to global economic governance; third, I outline a general critique of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO; fourth, I state the BRICS' critique of global economic governance, highlighting the first and second, rather than a third order challenge. I do so by illustrating the BRICS' counter-hegemonic potential and behaviour while at the same time supporting the ideas undergirding global economic governance and the West's domination of it; fifth, I show that some (ideational) considerations for third order change are not present to provide the BRICS with the context to successfully pursue a new paradigm; finally, I
conclude by briefly reflecting on the way forward.
II. Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework, borrowed from Farrell and Quiggin (2012) and Hall (1993) , provides the parameters for understanding the condition under which ideas can play a role in policy change. Consensus around ideas plays a role in bringing about legitimacy, and by extension, acceptance and implementation of the idea. albeit partly, as material interests and power are also in the mix driving legitimacy.
2 Farrell and Quiggin (2012:3-4) argue that ideas are more likely to impact policy when there is consensus among the expert community within which the ideas are generated. 3 If there is dissensus (divisions among experts) and these different ideas are adopted by and distributed among the policy community, these ideas are less likely to impact policy because policy makers have more options from which to choose. According to Farrell and Quiggin, "Whether there is expert consensus or expert dissensus will have important consequences for the power of economic ideas [...] expert ideas will be most likely to shape political outcomes when they are backed by an apparent consensus" (Farrell and Quiggin (2012:10) . In the context of this paper, lack of consensus among economists is among the important consideration for explaining why a paradigmatic shift has not taken place in global economic governance, after the global financial crisis.
The environment within which ideas operate also matter. the degree of authoritativeness that one set of ideas has over others in the eyes of policy makers; and third, policy failure around an existing paradigm and attempts at finding an alternative, (Hall 1993: 280) . Having outlined the conceptual framework, it is necessary to provide the literature on the various interpretations of the BRICS' challenge to global economic governance. to establish the novelty of this paper.
III. Perspectives of the BRICS challenge to global economic governance
In the first category of writings, there are diverse conclusions on the nature of the BRICS' opposition to global economic governance; however, what is common is the view that, while the BRICS are or may be challenging the nature of global economic governance, they are not contesting its philosophical foundations and may be reinforcing Western dominance of it in some instances. Further, these writings surmise that the BRICS are simply tweaking global economic governance while leaving the neoliberal capitalist paradigm intact.
Some observe that if anything, members of the BRICS club have made only minor changes to the system without disrupting the fundamentals of it. Similarly, those in this category posit that the BRICS reform efforts are 'adjustments' to the system and should not be seen as a challenge to it. For example, Cammack (2012:7) found that in the wake of the financial crisis, while the emerging economies were advocating greater representation for themselves and developing countries in the Group of 20 (G20) and the international financial institutions (IFIs), they were actively advancing 'global liberalism and universal competiveness…on a genuinely global scale. ' Similarly, Bond (2013:266) is of the view that the BRICS are reinforcing imperialist structures of global economic governance through 'sub-imperialist' practices (at the country and regional levels) which support corporate capital and legitimise neoliberalism. Kahler (2013) Overall, the revealed preferences of China, India and Brazil in global economic negotiations, both before and after the global financial crisis, were those of moderate reformers at best […] It was most often their participation in the process of rule creation and institutional evolution that was the key issue, not the content of the rules themselves (Kahler, 2013: 716) .
On a similar note, some posit that the BRICS are content to be a part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G20 and do not oppose these organisations in principle. What they oppose and propose reform for, are issues related to their participation. Among these issues are inadequate representation and inequity deriving from the dominance of Western powers of global economic institutions. Armijo and Roberts (2014:25) say that rising states-at least in timeby virtue of their increasing projected material capabilities, will challenge US hegemonic influence and shift the Western dominated agenda of international organisations. Cooper posits that while emerging powers have 'contested' global governance by forming the BRICS alliance, the BRICS favour the G20. However '(c)ontestation is targeted at […] functional issues of national interest and in leveraging their position inside the G20 for great [sic] fairness and equality of the system.' (Cooper, 2014: 89, 106) . Stephen (2012:309) shows that while there are differences across issue areas, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) states, they generally adopt a reformist posture to international institutions. In fact they "are multilateral activists strongly involved in international institutions, which they try to reform from the inside in their own favour."
Others say the BRICS are 'diversifying' global governance by creating parallel structures alongside Western created and dominated ones. This means that in a sense, the BRICS are seeking to strengthen their position in global economic governance from both within and outside of the existing system. Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) assert that China has conveniently been engaging increasingly in global governance but at the same time it has been exploring regional alternatives. Some claim that though independent of Western influence, regional options are not necessarily based on alternative models. Sohn proffers that China is neither challenging nor reinforcing global governance. Instead they are simultaneously establishing independent regional financial institutions (Sohn, 2013: 630-648) . Shield (2014:148) observes the same because China is considering bilateral and regional trade agreements and other alternative financial arrangements while also operating within existing global economic structures.
The other school of thought is that the BRICS are challenging the foundations of global economic governance and are proposing and/or creating alternatives to the neoliberal models. For instance, Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) suggest that China, in concert with Brazil and India, are seeking to transpose their domestic model of the 'developmental state' to the global arena. Stephen (2014: 19) There are those who think that the external environment plays a role in the outcome of the BRICS' challenge to global economic governance. For example, Beeson (2013: 246) contends that even if China, the leading BRICS power, has the material capability to pose a challenge to global economic governance, the current context is not conducive as in previous historical epochs for an ideological shift to take place; neither is there an alternative Chinese vision which has a global appeal or reach.
Another element of the literature of interest to this paper is the philosophical competitiveness. ' Beeson (2013:245) reasons that the inability of China to lead at the regional level -despite its increasing material capability -is hindered by many geostrategic and geopolitical considerations, including: the "reassertion of US strategic influence" in the AsiaPacific region. Bond (2013:266) explains the reinforcement of neoliberalism by South Africa through sub-imperialist practices via the facilitation of corporate capital and seeking new markets for raw materials, among other material factors. Kahler (2013: 714) posits that the emerging economies are seeking to influence global economic governance on the basis of their new economic weight, advocating for increasing their quota shares and greater representation in the IFIs. Armijo and Roberts (2014:507) also base the emerging powers'
challenge to global economic governance on their increasing material capabilities.
On the other hand, Cooper (2014:106) bases his argument of the formation of the BRICs alliance and their attitude to the G20 and global economic governance, in general, upon largely non-material considerations -their desire to be insiders and the prestige that is associated with it. Some anchor their explanations in both materialist and ideational factors. Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) seem to have anchored their analysis of China's ability to change the rules of the global order in both material and ideational factors -China's new status in the global economy, national interests and 'a desire to identify with other rising big powers such as Brazil and India. ' Sohn (2013:632, 634) (Brohman, 1995:297 (Brohman, 1995:314-315 ).
I now turn to the BRICS challenge specifically, having outlined the general criticisms of the IMF and the World Bank. This section shows that the BRICS are posing a first and second, rather than a third order challenge to global economic governance by rejecting certain aspects of the system while supporting the ideas undergirding global economic governance and the West's domination of it. 
IV. BRICS opposition to Western domination of the global economic order

V. BRICS support and reinforcement of the global economic order and Western hegemony
Borrowing from the reasoning of Langley (2004) In terms of process, in principle, the BRICS group is also reinforcing the elite club governance structure of global economic governance. As others have noted (Payne, 2014:73-85) , the participation of the BRICS countries in the G20 framework, though more inclusive than the G7/8 framework, is an expanded exclusive club among the developed and emerging economies with little direct or indirect participation of the global community. It is assumed, as has been done in the past, that those countries with heavier economic weight, and the ability to carry the economic burden, know how to best manage the global economy. The inclusion of BRICS countries, based on their phenomenal GDP growth in the global economy, simply expands the elite model of decision making, rather than democratizes it.
Furthermore, the BRICS have called for greater participation of emerging economies based on their increased economic weight in the world economy, reinforcing the participation principles of the IMF and the World Bank. In the Fortaleza Declaration (paragraph 7), the BRICS stated that the IMF reform process should take place to "better reflect the increasing BJIR, Marília, v. 6, n. 3, p. 442-467, set./dez. 2017.
weight of EMDCs 6 in the world economy… [and] [t]he Fund must remain a quota-based institution." While the BRICS have made a case for updating the existing formulas to reflect current realities, they have not questioned the principle behind the method. In fact, emerging economies are now ready to make greater contributions to IFIs because of promises of increased quota shares and higher level representation (Kahler, 2013:714) . 
VI. Absence of Conditions for Paradigm Shift
Notwithstanding the BRICS support for a model from which they have benefitted, the conditions outlined below -dissensus among experts and asymmetries in the research realmdo not support or facilitate a fundamental challenge to the existing global economic order and the exploration of an alternative which the BRICS could even consider.
a) Dissensus among Experts
6 Emerging Markets and Developing Countries.
… expert ideas will be most likely to shape political outcomes when they are backed by an apparent consensus" (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012:10) . dispute" (Bernanke, 2009: paragraph 1) . One scholar said the crisis resulted from "uncontrolled financial deregulation" (Lin and Treichel, 2012:72) . Another said, it resulted from "systemic failure […] due to the absence of a global rule-making authority to oversee global private financial institutions and processes" (Goldin and Vogel, 2010:6) . Others attributed the crisis to the failure of the discipline of economics which were unable to provide adequate tools to predict the crisis and a lack of transparency in their economic modelling (Colander, Föllmer, Haas, et al, 2009:14) . It was further argued that it was the obsession with mathematical modelling while ignoring broader socio-politico-historical factors that led to the failure of economists to predict and not heed warnings by some of the crisis (Hodgson, 2009 (Hodgson, : 1205 (Hodgson, -1221 . Panitch and Konings (2009:61) concur that deregulation was responsible for the financial crisis which began decades before the neoliberal era. Others suggested that the financial crisis was caused by the risky behaviour and poor management of the mortgage housing market (Vieira, 2011:217-237; Coffee, 2009: 1 -22; Poole, 2010: 421-441; Yeoh, 2009: 42-69; and Acharya and Richardson, 2009: 195-210) . Vieira noted that the financial crisis was "a crisis of confidence" and risky lending in the housing market whose ripple effect had international repercussions; although she concluded that "This new era should change the widespread liberal argument that the market is always efficient, or at least, more efficient than BJIR, Marília, v. 6, n. 3, p. 442-467, set./dez. 2017.
any State intervention" (Vieira, 2011:235) . Legg and Harris (2009: 366) point to the lack of transparency in the process of offering products to clients which did not allow them to assess the risk being undertaken; uncertainty about the value of products offered; inadequate regulation; an "unregulated shadow banking system"; and incentive misalignment and globalisation of capital flows. Yeoh (2009:44) reports that the crisis has been attributed to several factors: "adverse macro-economic conditions, bad corporate governance and loose regulatory oversight" but he surmises that the governance factors are the most relevant.
Official inquiry into the crisis blamed the crisis on similar issues and provided the following general causes:
widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision…dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions… a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency…"; lack of government preparation "for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets; [and] Some thought that the financial crisis signified a deeper problem beyond risky behaviour in the mortgage market. Scholars in this camp believe that it was a crisis of neoliberalism (Ceceña, 2009: 33-43; Altvater, 2009: 73 -86; Stiglitz, 2009: 1-21; Kotz 2015:3) . Some who share this view called for radical reform and an overhaul of the economic model upon which global economic governance is based (third order change). According to Stiglitz (2009:19) , the crisis resulted from the "failures in the financial system, to a large extent they were doing what actors in a market system are supposed to do: pursue their own self-interest." Rather than calling for improving the existing model of economic governance, Stiglitz called for a paradigm shift, i.e. changing the philosophy and foundation upon which global economic governance is based. He said, "there will be heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too are likely to fail.
Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do." Stiglitz (2009:7) . According to Hall (1990) 
b) Asymmetries in the research process and outcome
VI. Conclusion
Broadly, the paper has highlighted continuity in global economic governance with the role of ideas as the focus. The rationale for using the BRICS as the group of countries that could potentially play a role in pursuing a paradigm shift, is based on their critique of global economic governance -albeit it being reformist in orientation -their economic prowess and the capability this provides them to fundamentally challenge the system. The paper concurs with existing works which states that while BRICS countries are seeking to decentralise power in global economic governance and are making minor policy adjustments (first and second order changes), they have not yet engendered changes that amount to a paradigm shift (third order change) in global economic governance. The paper's novelty is in highlighting, the factors which hinder the effect that ideas could have had on the BRICS' potentially mounting a fundamental challenge to global economic governance, following the global financial crisis. The paper posits that a paradigm shift has been hindered by the absence of consensus on an alternative set of ideas to replace the neoliberal model of global economic governance as well as asymmetries among researchers and in the research process.
The neoliberal model came about as an outcome of a set of related ideas which formed a unified coherent framework of economic governance. The paper concludes that notwithstanding the role that interest based factors have played in informing the reformist orientation of the BRICS challenge to global economic governance, the consolidation of an alternative set of ideas or model -which is seen to benefit the BRICS' materially, and that of their populations -could drive the BRICS to mount a successful third order challenge to global economic governance. Part of the solution therefore lies in the development of a targeted alternative intellectual project towards achieving this objective.
